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Abstract: The paper explores the main causes behind- and spreading 
mechanics in- the wave of sovereign debt overhangs that has been mounting 
recently across Europe. We offer two concurrent explanations: international 
contagion of a macroeconomic shock, and structural flaws in the design of 
E(M)U and its development paradigm. Moreover, we found the immediate 
policy response to have repeatedly gone awry and turned sour, since EMU’s 
tactics of bailing out their banks rather than their sovereigns, can be 
summarized as the policy of too little, too late and to the wrong beneficiary. 
In compliance with the identified causes, we suggest urgent recourse to the 
healthier banking, growth oriented yet thriftier public finance, jointly with 
other measures meant to boost European economies’ competitiveness. 
Keywords: sovereign debt, fiscal policy, financial crisis, fiscal rules. 
1. Introduction 
Today, world economy is faced with the recourse to monetary financing of the 
government budget deficit, increasing levels of government indebtedness and the 
resurgence of the snow-ball nightmare in government debt management, mounting in a 
number of countries. Incoming wave of sovereign default on its debt threatens to be the 
sixth in the row of major turmoil’s in the last two centuries (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). It 
comes after Napoleonic War (1800s), 1820–1840, 1870–1890, Great depression and World 
War II (1930–1950), and Emerging market debt crisis (1980–1990). Unlike  the directly 
preceding episode, nowadays, even the most advanced economies on the planet undermined 
its stability and growth prospects with prodigal governmental spending. 
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What were the drivers of such fiscal profligacy? Government budget plays an 
important role in addressing wider set of both economic and social goals. This is a mighty 
societal account, but also politically often misused instrument. Since Keynesian revolution, 
governments all over the globe, through public spending, have been flattening the business 
cycle or at least attempting to do so. This role of government hasn’t been challenged almost 
entire century. The idea to use governmental spending as a substitute for weak private 
demand originated in times when a role of  government in the economy was much smaller 
than today. However, can we have and is it all the same in case of too much government? 
The responsibility of a contemporary government for social well-being is far more stretched 
out today than ever before. Some public expenditures have secular tendency to grow (health 
care, education, security, etc.) and do not depend on governmental readiness to accept 
additional responsibility. Moreover, many states promote themselves into a real “welfare 
state”, which drives the public spending to the unprecedented levels. Last but not least, 
tremendous increase in public debt occurred to the US, the EU and some other economies, 
after they stood up for distressed private financial industry. It means that “contingent 
liabilities”, which depend on instantaneous political considerations, may play a crucially 
important role in the contemporary design of demand for public goods. In the remainder of 
the paper we are dealing exactly with the latest reason without binding ourselves not to 
look at more distant economic rationale for such a behaviour.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews developments in 
the EU financial sector that came immediately after the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis. Section three focuses on the manner in which the key agents have responded to the 
problem at hand, while section four discusses some policy dilemmas. In the final section we 
go on to conclude.  
2. Financial Ambience After the Global Financial Crisis 
The first reaction on the incoming disturbance that came from policy circles was 
that as the main threat was coming from disappearing market liquidity. It should come as 
no surprise that policymakers and regulators look at that way, since the opposite to 
solvency issue, the liquidity issue need not to be traced directly to the policy mistakes, and 
allows easy-to-implement policy package. Borio (2010, p.70), inter alia, claims that 
evaporation of liquidity invariably plays a key role in the dynamics of financial distress. 
However, in this section, we shall try to exhibit the genesis of global financial disturbance, 
which tends to point out that often times exactly the opposite is (also) true. In spite of 
abundance of imprudently committed international liquidity yet again provided for perfect 
storm at the outskirts of the Eurozone, as soon as liquidity reached its prime, arguably the 
underlying sanity of decision making was seriously jeopardized already. Interestingly, once 
a hurricane of insolvency is on the move, global meltdown appears to be self-fulfilling by 
design, since bursting of individual financial asset bubbles drives investors and their capital 
away and into the following asset class, thereby inflating the next bubble until exploding 
and so on and so forth, resulting in cascading extinction of safe assets altogether.1 
                                                 
1
 On the global financial plane, number of sovereign issuers whose 10-year government bonds may be 
considered riskless has shrank so much after leading international credit rating agencies slashed 
financial reputation of 9 Eurozone members back in September 2011, that IMF estimates point at €9 
billion decrease in global supply of safe financial  assets through 2011-2016 period (IMF, 2012). 
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2.1 International Pretext 
Ever since September 2008, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
international interbank markets went paralysed and interbank lending beyond fairly brief 
maturities literally disappeared into a thin air. It has all started with real estate (so-called 
subprime) market bubble burst in late 2007 erupting into the global financial meltdown by 
mid-2008.  What are the main lessons that we learned the harder way from the initial wave 
of the international financial crisis? Depending on their own national specificities, financial 
systems can serve as safety nets or, if bad policy choices were made, may innovate 
themselves into metastatic amplifiers of crisis. For better part of the global investment 
banking industry, regrettably, acquiring competitive advantage came down to making 
markets less efficient. “One catastrophically diligent way of doing that is to start off 
myopically focused on circumventing capital requirements at the expense of the long-run 
value creation, only to keep surfing on a deliberately raised asset-price tide whose 
ephemeral nature proverbially tends to be secluded by hidden or obscured information” 
(Malovic, 2009, p.120). As is well-known by now, the crisis has been boosted by sky-
hiking agricultural and petrol prices, weak supervision of credit derivatives and 
expansionary monetary policy worldwide, but in our opinion, essential culprit of this –still 
consequential- global distress is choking overregulation of plain-vanilla banking in parallel 
with astonishing excuse of any regulation whatsoever of non-banking intermediaries and 
global OTC markets!2 By expanding aggressively or simply by joining the frenzy band 
wagon, international financial intermediaries gave birth to multiples of fancy asset-backed 
securitized structured products, which inevitably got out of control. In turn, derivative 
mutation provoked shivers of illiquidity across the financial industry and following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, unleashed a systemic run in the inter-bank credit market, a 
massive spike in corporate bond rates and a tremendous loss of consumer and business 
confidence (Malovic, 2008, 2009). 
Due to its conservative morphology and less exposure to collateralized debt 
obligations, credit default swaps and other credit derivatives that subsequently turned soar, 
European banking system initially fared better through the global financial crisis, showing 
resilience and lending orientation towards down-to-the-earth industries and traditionally 
safe(r) sovereigns.  However, owing to constructional flaws in a design of the Euro(zone), 
fiscal profligacy of its periphery and moral hazard of Western (European) banks, soon 
enough tables have turned dramatically.  
2.2 Bank Distress, Liquidity Squeeze and Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe 
Gradual dissipation of non-sovereign safe assets as well as fears of after-
explosions of toxic assets in either banks’ balance sheets or balance sheets of their clients 
and finally general uncertainty in distinguishing between sound and unsound financial 
intermediaries, all of the above jointly prompted European banks to increasingly lend to 
sovereigns. Rise in credit rating of E(M)U periphery after waves of enlargement enabled 
them to indebt themselves more cheaply and consequently brought about real estate 
bubbles, stock exchange rallies and swelling imports. In tables (1 and 2) below the data on 
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government balance and debt are presented. It looks obvious that either the joining EU or 
the accepting common currency does not guarantee fiscal convergence. Quite contrary, it 
make less costly irresponsible fiscal policy, but not indefinitely.  
Table 1. Government deficit/surplus: Selected EU countries (% GDP) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Euro area –1.3 –0.7 –2.1 –6.4 –6.2 –4.1 
EU (27) –1.5 –0.9 –2.4 –6.9 –6.5 –4.5 
Advanced 
  Germany –1.6 0.2 –0.1 –3.2 –4.3 –1.0 
  France –2.3 –2.7 –3.3 –7.5 –7.1 –5.2 
PIIGS 
  Ireland 2.9 0.1 –7.3 –14.0 –31.2 –13.1 
  Italy –3.4 –1.6 –2.7 –5.4 –4.6 –3.9 
  Greece –5.7 –6.5 –9.8 –15.6 –10.3 –9.1 
  Portugal –4.6 –3.1 –3.6 –10.2 –9.8 –4.2 
  Spain 2.4 1.9 –4.5 –11.2 –9.3 –8.5 
New members 
  Bulgaria 1.9 1.2 1.7 –4.3 –3.1 –2.1 
  Hungary –9.4 –5.1 –3.7 –4.6 –4.2 4.3 
  Romania –2.2 –2.9 –5.7 –9.0 –6.8 –5.2 
Source: Eurostat: Principal European Economic Indicators Database.  
Although it has been started as the fourth generation crisis stemming from 
financial leverage and contagion effects in credit derivatives market, deepening of the 
European sovereign debt crisis came about in the third generation, so-called twin crisis 
fashion. Namely, it may also be rooted in EU export competitiveness. Too strong and way 
too early introduced common European currency caused export price competitiveness of 
EMU periphery to plummet, while it simultaneously redirected technologically staggering 
German exports to the outskirts of monetary union and its satellites (Lapavitsas et alia, 
2010; Young, Semmler, 2011). Ensuing balance of payments deficits of EMU periphery 
soon enough spilled over to fiscal deficits and mounting public indebtedness. To make 
matters worse, Merler and Pisany-Ferry (2012) document that such a benign current 
account view (‘there can be no BoP crisis in a currency union’) hasn’t been merely 
challenged by reality  -bearing on causality and optimal policy response which thus far 
remains stubbornly focused on harsh budgetary discipline alone, but has also been 
additionally amplified by massive capital flow reversals in EMU’s periphery on at least 
three occasions since the outbreak of the international financial crisis.  
Initial interest spread spikes followed by the wave of downgrading of European 
sovereigns both owe to the existence of common currency under which individual central 
banks no longer have control over domestic money creation, effectively stripping them to 
emerging markets’ original sin status (De Grauwe, 2011). By the time western European 
banks triggered the sudden stop in further lending to sovereigns and forced the ESCB to 
partly roll those loans over via TARGET2, they were already overly exposed to highly 
indebted PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). European sovereign debt crisis 
that openly erupted on its own specific accord in early 2010, however, still contains some 
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globally common ingredients: namely, rising government expenditures and overall 
recession, both of which contributed to dramatic deterioration of debt-to-GDP ratios.  
Table 2. General government gross debt: Selected EU countries (% GDP) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Euro area 68.6 66.3 70.1 79.9 85.3 87.2 
EU (27) 61.6 59.0 62.5 74.8 80.0 82.5 
Advanced 
  Germany 68.1 65.2 66.7 74.4 83.0 81.2 
  France 63.7 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3 85.8 
PIIGS 
  Ireland 24.5 24.8 44.2 65.1 92.5 108.2 
  Italy 106.1 103.1 105.7 116.0 118.6 120.1 
  Greece 106.1 107.4 113.0 129.4 145.0 165.3 
  Portugal 69.3 68.3 71.6 83.1 93.3 107.8 
  Spain 39.7 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.2 68.5 
New members 
  Bulgaria 21.6 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.3 16.3 
  Hungary 65.9 67.1 73.0 79.8 81.4 80.6 
  Romania 12.4 12.8 13.4 23.6 30.5 33.3 
Source: Eurostat: Principal European Economic Indicators Database.  
Table 3. Long term government bond yield: Selected EU countries 
 Year 2011 Year 2012 
 Jun Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr 
Euro area 4.50 4.63 4.65 4.45 4.06 4.24 
EU (27) 4.40 4.29 4.32 4.16 3.89 3.99 
Advanced       
  Germany 2.89 1.93 1.82 1.85 1.83 1.62 
  France 3.43 3.16 3.18 3.02 2.95 2.99 
PIIGS       
  Ireland 11.43 8.70 7.71 7.02 6.90 6.88 
  Italy 4.82 6.81 6.54 5.55 5.05 5.68 
  Greece 16.69 21.14 25.91 29.24 19.07 21.48 
  Portugal 10.87 13.08 13.85 12.81 13.01 12.01 
  Spain 5.48 5.53 5.41 5.11 5.17 5.79 
New members 
  Bulgaria 5.39 5.23 5.30 5.31 5.07 5.11 
  Hungary 7.22 8.97 9.51 8.60 8.73 8.77 
  Romania 7.42 7.39 7.02 6.99 6.48 6.25 
Source: Eurostat: Principal European Economic Indicators Database.  
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Liquidity squeeze that followed was supplemented by further restricting 
regulations of Basel 3 (e.g. capital adequacy ratio hike from 8 to 9%)3, which will require 
Europe’s banks to immediately bolster their capital positions by rather optimistically 
estimated €106 billion.4 Banks in France, the UK, Ireland, Germany, and Spain have 
already announced plans to write off some €775 billion of assets until the end of this year, 
according to data collected by Bloomberg (Chassany et alia, 2011). It is a well-established 
fact that solvency-protective measures can precipitate credit crunch. Berger and Udell 
(1994) found the risk-based capital regulation, imposed to creditors during the banking and 
saving and loans crisis in 1990s, may be held responsible for the credit crunch. Similarly, 
Bernauer and Koubi (2004) found the same pattern in US and Japanese policy response to 
endangered bank solvency in the 2000s. However, The EBA tests imply that roughly one 
third of the banks sampled desperately requires stronger capital buffers in order for them to 
honour the June 2012 deadline (Kinsella and O’Sullivan, 2011). However, a recent IMF 
(2012) analysis found that only a small fraction of banks are in the high-risk zone, 
representing 1 per cent of total bank assets, while a greater proportion (22 per cent of banks 
representing 12 per cent of assets) fall into the second-highest risk zone. Be that as it may, 
European banks would probably have to reduce their balance sheets by the aggregate of 
1.5-2.5 trillion € over the course of the next 18 months to meet more stringent capital 
requirements, quite apart from the further crippling losses which could originate from CDS-
related insurance sold against bunk runs and alike default events. It is not entirely clear 
where all that money might come from, yet it is beyond doubt that banks will sharply 
reduce their cross-border, foreign denominated and riskier exposures. Examples of lending 
contraction are already plain to see, including Germany’s Commerzbank’s halting new 
property lending in its Euro-Hypo unit and a 20% fall in the number of “active” lenders in 
the UK from 2010 to 2011 (HSBC, 2011, M3 Capital Partners, 2011).  
Nevertheless, thus far recorded deleveraging process in European banks in our 
opinion amounts to no more than a game theoretical foreplay if we are to avoid moral hazard 
and reaching into the European taxpayers’ pockets, because couple of relatively abundant 
liquidity injections by the ECB and/or EFSF were –rightly or wrongly- interpreted by banks 
as maneuvering space advising against too much restructuring too soon.  
3. Monetary Resolution Attempts and Latest Regulatory Initiatives 
With the credit crunch kicking in and sovereign debt hitting unsustainable levels, 
EU officials responded with good old throwing money at the problem. It started with €130 
billion of central bank funding via TARGET to the Bank of Greece (largely passed on to 
Greek banks). Moreover, to calm the markets after the 2010 bailout, additional €40 billion 
of Greek bonds were bought by the ECB, followed by the second Greek bail-out (ironically 
also known as Private Sector Involvement Swap) and two gigantic LTRO (Long Term 
Refinancing Operations) liquidity injections in between.  
                                                 
3
 Basel 3 measures especially aim at tightening liquidity aspect of banking business, as captured by 
new weighted average liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) (BIS, 
2012). 
4
 In a similar fashion, Solvency 2 is expected to render uneconomical many a policy, cut down 
liquidity and increase the number of too-big-to-fail insurance companies in the EU. 
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Initial unsatisfactory consequence of EMU’s decision to bail out their banks rather 
than their sovereigns, can be summarized as too little, too late and to the wrong beneficiary. 
First of all, due to the fact that international financial institutions prior to the second Greek 
bailout provided liquidity directly to banks at ridiculous one per cent interest rate whereas 
the banks themselves only partially committed themselves to refinancing of their claims 
against sovereigns often at above six per cent interest, European banks’ exposure to the 
sovereign bonds of vulnerable Eurozone members generally decreased during the period 
December 2010 to September 2011 (Angeloni and Wolff, 2012). Moreover, the second 
Greek bailout, in fact the biggest orderly default in the history of sovereign debt 
management, actually represented a Public Sector Involvement in spite of the semantics in 
which it was camouflaged in media: banks were almost simultaneously compensated for 
most of the nominal concessions they provisionally agreed to, while the official creditors 
not only engaged taxpayers’ money substantially letting the banks off the hook, but also 
crowded potential new private ones out down the pecking order of their more senior claims. 
The outcome invoked moral hazard issues, steep cost and ineffectiveness of such a rescue 
as well as natural reluctance of European banks to commit themselves to more serious 
write-offs, deleveraging and restructuring efforts.  
Similarly, more than €1 trillion borrowed by banks through ECB’s two LTROs in 
December 2011 and February 2012 temporarily conserved their stock market value and 
lowered sovereigns’ interest rate premia, at the expense of more pronounced moral hazard 
problems5 (than the ones resulting from direct ECB intervention into sovereign debt 
markets) as well as potentially reflationary excessive monetary expansion6. Oakley (2012) 
warns how particularly volatile LTROs might have been in the case of Spanish public debt 
and solvency of its banking sector. 
The more recent unsatisfactory effect of European version of quantitative easing 
finally bears resemblance with the US counterpart in as much as the banks that are stronger 
appear to have been hoarding cash, which has led to another wave of a liquidity squeeze in 
the interbank market. For example, most of the €56 billion supplemental long-term 
refinancing operations (SLTRO) provided on 26 October 2011 were placed back into the 
deposit facility, which implies that banks with surpluses are holding cash rather than 
lending it further to the real economy or even other banks in liquidity distress (Davies and 
Yogarajah, 2011). Unlike many other analysts, we see this development as a good sign of 
banks’ fading certainty about ESCB’s readiness to continuously bail them out in the future. 
We argue that the optimal policy should indeed be direct LOLR intervention via some sort 
of Eurobonds after national deposit insurance schemes have been sufficiently strengthened. 
That would bail in the banking sector instead of obliging taxpayers from the Eurozone’s 
core. Instead, persuaded either by the bank-centric monetary policy view as explained in 
Kashyap and Stein (1994) or by lobbying pressure of European banking industry,  EMU 
officials and Germany in particular seem to have decided to keep using undercapitalized 
EFSF and ESM as banking sector bail-out fund. Notwithstanding the uncomfortable fact 
that European banks are largely governed by national regulations and yet they expanded 
                                                 
5
 Compared to their likely future losses, European banks have raised relatively little capital since the 
onset of LTRO – and much of this has been creative accounting, rather than truly loss-absorbing 
shareholder equity (Acemoglu, Johnson, 2012). 
6
 Because banks channeled only a fraction of the liquidity obtained into sovereign bond markets, the 
ECB had to pour more money into the system than if it had to intervene itself (De Grauwe, 2012). 
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their balance sheets (as well as their risk taking) all over EMU, which welcomes the 
creation of some sort of pan-European deposit insurance scheme or even a banking union 
(Malovic, 2012), the very latest European Commission’s support for the strategy of further 
bail-outs in European banking sector rather than helping out their indebted governments 
(BBC, 2012), in all likelihood does not represent a step in the right direction. And time is 
no doubt getting shorter. 
Speaking of time, Reinhart et alia (2012) found that out of 26 prominent episodes 
of debt overhang, 20 lasted for more than a decade even for sovereign with continuous 
access to international capital markets at fairly low interest rates. Apparently, growth-
reducing effects of sovereign debt crisis in EMU are not transmitted exclusively through 
credit and interest rate channel of monetary policy, but also through moral hazard, 
unemployment and the all-encompassing crisis of trust. EBA’s (European Bank Authority) 
stress testing may well be estimating the inevitable losses, but Eurocrats’ stalling in their 
political and macroeconomic gridlock could easily unleash the bank runs taking the fatal 
decision instead and ahead of the politicians. 
4. Rule Based Fiscal Policy or Discretion: the Way Out 
Either way stimulated prodigal public spending brings the austerity package to the 
forefront of academic and policy discussions, making urgent recourse to the healthy 
finance. The ardent policy debate come to the cross-road, when policy-makers must decide 
which way to take:  austerity measures vs. further stimulus of aggregate demand. Probably 
thanks to EU accession window, IMF closer monitoring, and uncomfortable fiscal history, 
the Republic of Serbia as well as its neighbouring countries are better performers in terms 
of public debt than old EU members (Table 4). The worst performers are obviously EU 
peripheral countries.  
Table 4. Selected debt sustainability indicators (2010) 
Region/Country Debt to GDP     
ratio 
Government 
balance/GDP 
External 
debt/GDP 
South-eastern Europe  
  Albania 58.2 –4.2   36.6 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina 39.7 –4.5   56.6 
  FYR Macedonia 24.6 –2.5   59.0 
  Montenegro 44.1 –3.8 100.2 
  Serbia 44.9 –4.6   83.1 
Central Europe 
  Croatia 40.6 –5.0 102.1 
  Slovenia  37.3 –5.6 115.2 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 2011. 
With worldwide scope of debt issue, possibility for external monitors to bring 
discipline to the fiscal policy is seriously undermined. Sustainable and responsible fiscal 
and monetary policy is the only way out of fragility, and responsibility for this task today 
rests predominantly to internal policy actors.   
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More than ever before, the rules are seen as better response than the discretion. 
There are different ways for implementing rules in budget policy. Examples are public debt 
ceiling (US), Maastricht convergence criteria  (two out of five) tackle fiscal policy (budget 
deficit and consolidated public debt), and more recently public debt (to GDP) ceiling in 
Serbia. Debt ceiling itself may be put relative to GDP or in absolute nominal terms. In the 
latter case it is more susceptible to window dressing. Stick to the simple rules is a proposal 
already seen and widely debated in area of monetary policy. The voices for currency board 
proposal in case of Serbia were especially strong in late 1990s (Dinkić, 1999; Fabris, 1999; 
Savić, 1999; Galić, 1999). Motivation for switching to the rules in both monetary and fiscal 
policy defers no much. The arguments for the fiscal rules are the same as the case with 
monetary rules: policy incompetence, inability to resist public pressure, etc. Equally, the 
flaws are very similar. The rules rule out flexibility. Thus, the rules are often proposed in 
harsh times with an idea to stay in place a limited period of time. Interestingly, 
implementation of debt ceiling in Serbia coincides with voices that advocates rule-based 
monetary policy (see Vuković (2011) for renewal of currency board proposal).  
The fiscal rules are easy to monitor and transparent. That is recognized as basic 
strength of the proposal. However, the rules are not implemented by themselves. There is a 
number of ways to circumvent the rules: creative accounting, consolidation issues, public 
guarantees, etc. (Kitanović et alia, 2011, 125). The ultimate effect of the rule-based policy 
depends on how effective are mechanisms available for enforcement. Since nothing but 
political costs constrains those who infringe the rules, political mechanism stays the only 
effective brake. At the end, it is now all understood that political economy of fiscal 
adjustments is more politics than economy, firstly because the very nature of political 
system shapes the way society is going to respond to the issue (Kahler, 1985; Kaufman, 
1985), and further on, because the threats are all political. As stated remarkably in Alesina 
et alia, (1998, 198) “[d]eficit reduction policies are almost always associated with 
politically charged issues, such as the retrenchment of overextended welfare states, the 
reform of insolvent public pension systems, and the trimming of large and inefficient 
bureaucracies.” Despite of legal mandate to prevent excessive public debt, parliamentary 
control proved not to be effective in the case of Serbia. In this case, specific electoral 
legislative weakens the possibility of Parliament to act as effective government monitor.  
Conclusions 
Weakening growth prospects of the so called Old Europe, which is merely a 
consequence of loosing technological and subsequently competitiveness’ battle  against the 
fast growing global competitors, forced its banks to look for easy catch in real estate 
finance, capture the local market businesses and sovereign lending to support such 
investment. It was easy to incite the real estate boom by diverging massive funds from 
strictly appraised commercial lending into the real estate bubble, trade finance of politically 
muscled deals and seemingly risk-free lending to the Eurozone’s sovereigns. In the next 
stage, governments generously accepted to step in and moreover bail out equally profligate  
private banking industry with massive liquidity injections, which shifted the financial as 
well as ethical burden from private to public sector yet again. 
From the European perspective, the trigger of the debt crisis is unquestionably  
imported macroeconomic shock. However, the wrong policy reaction oriented to safeguard 
big (banks) and high profile corporate interest have spilled the oil on the open flame of 
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financial distress. Europe failed to adjust overextended welfare state to sluggish economic 
growth. Though the explanations of causes and mechanics are by now more or less 
concurrent, they point to different economic paths out of it. It is now obvious that the 
massive public interventions failed to initiate the economic growth and badly needed 
technological advancement. If the loosing competitive advantage of Old Europe over the 
global competitors turned out to be a more protracted phenomenon, recourse to the 
healthier public finance should momentarily become ever more urgent.   
For a small and open country, which linked its future to the EU, it is even more 
important to learn from the big neighbor’s experiences. It is of unprecedented importance to 
jam the public money-wasting machine before it’s too late. If EMU is to survive, both real 
and nominal expansion are sine qua non, but their targets must be growth and employment 
inducing. Rent-seeking and moral hazard are not welcome!   
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EPIDEMIJA JAVNOG ZADUŽIVANJA ŠIROM EVROPE:  
U POTRAZI ZA UZROCIMA I MEHANIKOM  
Rezime: U radu istražujemo glavne uzroke koji su doveli do širenja talasa 
otkaza u servisiranju javnog duga širom Evrope. Nudimo dva meñusobno 
saglasna objašnjenja: spoljni makroekonomski šok i strukturne greške u 
dominantnoj razvojnoj paradigmi. Utvrdili smo da je neposredna reakcija 
ekonomske politike imala nepovoljne efekte, jer se odluka EMU da spašava 
svoje banke izlažući javni sektor, može oceniti kao neadekvatna, 
neblagovremena i loše usmerena. Saglasno identifikovanim uzrocima, 
predlažemo neodložnu primenu mera za uspostavljanje zdravijeg bankarstva, 
razvojno orijentisane ali štedljivije fiskalne politike, uporedo sa merama za 
podsticaj konkurentnosti na globalnom nivou.   
Ključne reči: javni dug, fiskalna politika, finansijska kriza, pravila fiskalne 
politike.  
